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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 06/04/2006

Accident number: 291

Accident time: not recorded

Accident Date: 16/03/1992

Where it occurred: not made available

Country: Kuwait

Primary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Handling accident

Date of main report: [No date recorded]

ID original source: KMOD 53/SER 44

Name of source: Various/AVS 2001:K14

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: Valmara 69 AP Bfrag

Ground condition: not applicable

Date record created: 19/02/2004

Date last modified: 19/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
no independent investigation available (?)
inadequate investigation (?)
inadequate equipment (?)

Accident report
The details of Kuwait Boards of Inquiry are considered ‘Commercial in Confidence”. The
following summary is gathered from various documentary and anecdotal evidence made
available during the research. All anecdotal evidence is drawn from sources who were in
Kuwait at the time of the accident.
The victim had arrived in Kuwait on 13th May 1991, so had been working there for ten
months.
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An ex-pat mine clearance team was clearing the forward edge of the main barrier minefield.
The edge was sown with VS – T trip flares and V-69 bounding fragmentation mines, all with
tripwires deployed.
Operators had disarmed many V-69 mines but some had detonators that were stuck in place.
These were placed in a designated area for disposal at the end of each day. At the end of the
day, the team leader instructed all the other members to pack up the equipment while he went
to the stock of V-69 bounding fragmentation mines a safe distance from the rest of the team
to try to remove the remaining detonators, or to destroy the mines if this was not possible.
Some det-wells were wet and after they had dried the detonators would drop out easily.
It is variously reported that orders were varied (or that “Custom & Practice” had evolved) to
allow the use of artery forceps (tweezers) to extract detonators. This speeded up the end-ofday process. The victim had been tasked with removing those detonators that did not fall out
easily.
It is believed that the victim was using artery forceps to extract a detonator when he
inadvertently prodded into it. The detonators are “stab-sensitive”. The mine activated and he
was killed instantly. No details of his injuries were made available.
The company’s managers denied knowing that artery forceps were used to extract
detonators. Field people believe that this was a cynical attempt to save face. Field operatives
claim that it was a known and approved short-cut to avoid having to prepare a controlled
demolition at the end of each day. All sources to date report that it had been going on for
weeks or months [depending on source] with the knowledge and approval of the management
from Team-Leaders to “the top”.

Victim Report
Victim number: 367

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: supervisory

Fit for work: DECEASED

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: Frag jacket

Protection used: not recorded

Helmet
Short visor
Trousers/leggings

Summary of injuries:
FATAL
COMMENT
Severe fatal injuries from blast and fragmentation.
No medical report was made available.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Management/control inadequacy” because
the victim was tasked to carry out an activity that involved unacceptable risk whether or not
forceps were used.
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The change to using tweezers (forceps) to save time when removing detonators was
apparently a move to copy US practice. Clearly the risk of prodding into a stab-sensitive
detonator was not considered high. Those in management who made this decision bear some
responsibility for the accident. The attempt to pretend that the change was not “formal”
implies that some people recognised that responsibility belatedly.
There is a paucity of reliable data for many of the accidents that occurred in Kuwait. If any
reader has additional detail, please send it for inclusion.
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